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PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN A GLOBAL 
WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISIONS IN GOODYEAR  
DUNLOP TIRES AND NICASTRO 
JOHN N. DROBAK

 
ABSTRACT 
In June 2011 the Supreme Court decided two momentous personal 
jurisdiction cases: one, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 
limited general jurisdiction to its rightful narrow role as a way to 
establish state court jurisdiction, while the other, J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, barely staved off a second attempt to narrow “stream of 
commerce” as a vehicle for jurisdiction. Although both cases made those 
valuable contributions to doctrine, they also denied a United States court 
to U.S. citizens who sued foreign defendants for torts, effectively leaving 
the plaintiffs without remedies for the allegedly negligent acts of the 
defendants. Goodyear Dunlop Tires involved an accident outside the 
United States, while Nicastro arose from an injury in New Jersey. With 
globalization bringing increased international business and travel, there is 
sure to be a significant increase in injuries suffered by U.S. citizens as a 
result of the negligent activities of foreign businesses and a resultant 
increase in the type of litigation involved in the two new cases. This 
Article critiques both cases and then examines whether non-citizens are 
protected by constitutional personal jurisdiction rights. Outside the 
context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held since the 
nineteenth century that the scope of constitutional protections varies 
depending on two factors: whether a party is a citizen of the United States 
or a foreign national and whether a non-citizen resides in the United 
States or abroad. Without any real consideration, the Supreme Court in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro applied the same personal 
jurisdiction law to non-citizen, non-resident defendants as it applies to 
defendants who are U.S. citizens. This Article argues that non-resident, 
non-citizen defendants are not protected by the constitutional personal 
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Bryan Lammon, Ronald Levin, Julian Lim, Greg Magarian, Kim Norwood, Adam Rosenzweig, and 
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jurisdiction law developed in domestic litigation. Freed from 
constitutional constraints, the Supreme Court has the ability to fashion a 
new law of personal jurisdiction for foreign defendants better suited for 
the tort claims of U.S. citizens, taking into account the interests of the U.S. 
plaintiffs. The Article provides a foundation for developing a new law of 
personal jurisdiction for foreign defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2011 the Supreme Court decided two momentous personal 
jurisdiction cases: one wisely limited general jurisdiction to its rightful, 
narrow role as a way to establish state court jurisdiction, while the other 
barely staved off a second attempt to narrow ―stream of commerce‖ as a 
vehicle for jurisdiction. Although both cases made those valuable 
contributions to doctrine, they also denied a United States court to U.S. 
citizens who sued foreign defendants for torts, effectively leaving the 
plaintiffs without remedies for the allegedly negligent acts of the 
defendants. The general jurisdiction case, Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations v. Brown,
1
 involved an accident outside the United States, 
while the stream of commerce case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro,
2
 arose from an injury in New Jersey. With globalization bringing 
increased international business and travel, there is sure to be a significant 
increase in injuries suffered by U.S. citizens as a result of the negligent 
activities of foreign businesses and a resultant increase in the type of 
litigation involved in the two new cases. Not only do the cases close off a 
forum in the United States, they also make it virtually impossible for these 
kinds of disputes to be resolved under U.S. tort law since the plaintiffs 
must sue in foreign courts. Effectively, Goodyear Dunlop Tires and 
Nicastro make it impossible for injured citizens to assert their tort rights, 
thereby violating the underlying purpose of procedural law to further, and 
not hinder, the application of substantive law. 
This Article proceeds as follows: After explaining the Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires case, it discusses the general/specific jurisdiction model 
devised by Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman,
3
 shows how 
subsequent cases departed from their original meaning of general 
jurisdiction, and then applauds Goodyear Dunlop Tires for clarifying the 
 
 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 3. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). 
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law and returning general jurisdiction to its intended limited form of 
jurisdiction. In Part II, the Article examines the two muddled opinions in 
Nicastro that led to the finding of a lack of jurisdiction and shows how the 
six Justices on those opinions misapplied precedent. Part III examines 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants by returning to the fundamental 
question of whether non-citizens are protected by constitutional rights. 
Outside the context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held 
since the nineteenth century that the scope of constitutional protections 
varies depending on two factors: whether a party is a citizen of the United 
States or a foreign national and whether a non-citizen resides in the United 
States or abroad.
4
 Without any real consideration, the Supreme Court in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro applied the same personal 
jurisdiction law to non-citizen, non-resident defendants as it applies to 
defendants who are U.S. citizens. This essay argues that non-resident, non-
citizen defendants are not protected by the constitutional personal 
jurisdiction law developed in domestic litigation. Freed from the 
constitutional constraints, the Supreme Court has the ability to fashion a 
new law of personal jurisdiction for foreign defendants better suited for 
the tort claims of U.S. citizens. Rather than concentrating solely on the 
defendant‘s activities and rights, this new law should incorporate a 
concern for U.S. workers and consumers who are injured by foreign 
businesses. It is one thing to require a New York resident to sue in a 
California court for a tort claim stemming from a defective product made 
in California. Regardless of a New York or California forum, the litigation 
will still be governed by some state‘s version of U.S. tort law. It is quite 
another to require the New York resident to sue in China for injuries 
suffered as a result of a defective good made in China, where the dispute 
would be governed by Chinese law. This Article attempts to provide a 
foundation for a new personal jurisdiction law that will be fairer to citizens 
of the United States. 
I. GENERAL JURISDICTION AND GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES  
OPERATIONS V. BROWN 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires grew out of a bus accident outside Paris. The 
bus overturned on its way to Charles de Gaulle airport as it was carrying 
youth soccer players on their trip home to North Carolina.
5
 The parents of 
two thirteen-year-old boys who died brought a wrongful death action in 
 
 
 4. See infra notes 143–44. 
 5. 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
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state court in North Carolina against Goodyear USA and three foreign 
subsidiaries, which operated respectively in Turkey, France, and 
Luxemburg.
6
 The complaint alleged that a defective tire manufactured in 
Turkey by Goodyear‘s Turkish subsidiary caused the accident.7 In 
response to the motion by the three foreign subsidiaries to dismiss for a 
lack of personal jurisdiction, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled 
that jurisdiction existed under the theory of general jurisdiction.
8
 The court 
recognized that specific jurisdiction was lacking because the accident 
occurred in France and the tire was allegedly designed and manufactured 
negligently in Turkey.
9
 
The facts showed minimal connections between the three foreign 
subsidiaries and North Carolina. ―They [had] no place of business, 
employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.‖10 Nor were they 
registered to do business there.
11
 ―[T]hey [did] not solicit business in 
North Carolina . . . or ship tires to North Carolina customers.‖12 The 
Supreme Court described their only connection to North Carolina as 
follows: 
Even so, a small percentage of petitioners‘ tires (tens of thousands 
out of tens of millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were 
distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. 
These tires were typically custom ordered to equip specialized 
vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse 
trailers. Petitioners state, and respondents do not here deny, that the 
type of tire involved in the accident . . . was never distributed in 
North Carolina.
13
  
Personal jurisdiction had to stand or fall on the subsidiary‘s connections, 
not on Goodyear USA‘s connections, because the parents had belatedly 
raised the argument that Goodyear USA‘s connections to North Carolina 
were relevant to the personal jurisdiction issue. As the Court said, the 
parents ―forfeited‖ the contention that the subsidiaries were part of a 
―single enterprise‖ with Goodyear USA by raising it for the first time on 
 
 
 6. Id. at 2850. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 2851. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 2852. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/4
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argument to the Court.
14
 Given the meager connections between the 
subsidiaries and North Carolina, it was to be expected that a unanimous 
Court would hold that general jurisdiction was lacking. However, more 
important than the holding, the explanation of the general jurisdiction 
doctrine offered by Justice Ginsburg in her opinion for the Court and her 
analysis of the way the doctrine is to apply demonstrate a much narrower 
reach of general jurisdiction than many have thought. 
A. The General/Specific Jurisdiction Model of von Mehren and Trautman 
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman devised a model of personal 
jurisdiction in 1966 that divided all assertions of jurisdiction into two 
categories they named general and specific jurisdiction. They explained 
their model as follows: 
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the 
underlying controversy normally support only the power to 
adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, 
the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This 
we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice 
for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of 
controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or 
indirect, between the forum and the person or persons whose legal 
rights are to be affected. This we call general jurisdiction.
15
 
The category of general jurisdiction includes a broad variety of traditional 
bases for jurisdiction: consent, presence (service of process), ―domicile or 
habitual residence‖ (citizenship), and presence of assets in the forum (both 
in rem and quasi in rem).
16
 Specific jurisdiction includes all the other bases 
for jurisdiction, which we would say today, arise out of the minimum 
contacts test of International Shoe.
17
 
Von Mehren and Trautman proposed their model of specific/general 
jurisdiction as a better categorization of jurisdiction than the classification 
of in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam jurisdiction.
18
 They were not 
proposing a new basis for determining personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, 
their classification scheme took on a life of its own in a few Supreme 
 
 
 14. Id. at 2857. 
 15. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136. 
 16. Id. at 1136–41. 
 17. See Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 18. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1164–65; see also Mary Twitchell, The Myth of 
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 611 (1988). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court opinions, in lower court cases, and in the commentary about 
personal jurisdiction.
19
 At times, the model became a requirement for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction: if there was no general or specific 
jurisdiction, there could not be any personal jurisdiction. There are a 
number of reasons this happened. The two-part classification is a useful 
shorthand way to describe some types of lawsuits, which is essential for 
reasoning by analogy.
20
 In addition, the ―continuous and systematic‖ 
business standard of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
21
 the 
foundational general jurisdiction case, was malleable enough to enable 
courts to establish jurisdiction easily, without needing to examine the 
factors relevant to specific jurisdiction.
22
 The use of a broad conception of 
general jurisdiction was a convenient way to simplify the analysis.
23
 As a 
result, judges, parties, and commentators argue over the meaning of 
specific and general jurisdiction as a way to decide if jurisdiction exists. 
That is why the model has become so important to the case law. 
The Supreme Court and commentators have used the von Mehren and 
Trautman model to give more breadth to the concept of general 
jurisdiction than the authors intended. Most people seem to view general 
jurisdiction as a species of jurisdiction based on minimum contacts. That 
is understandable since International Shoe held that the due process clause 
requires that a defendant have ―minimum contacts with [the forum] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‗traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.‘‖24 The connections between the defendant 
and the forum that constitute general jurisdiction must satisfy the due 
process clause. However, there really is no need to label all forms of 
personal jurisdiction as constituting minimum contacts. Citizenship, 
presence, and consent were all constitutional bases for jurisdiction before 
 
 
 19. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984); infra text 
accompanying notes 69–72. 
 20. Rocky Rhodes has noted that many courts rely on the relationship between the cause of 
action and the forum in general jurisdiction cases. This infuses ―a doctrinal impurity into the 
jurisdictional analysis. The harm is not limited to the particular decision, since a common 
methodology for resolving general jurisdiction queries is to compare the quantity and quality of 
contacts to those contacts found sufficient in prior cases.‖ Charles W. ―Rocky‖ Rhodes, Clarifying 
General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 822 (2004).  
 21. 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). 
 22. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 182, 190.  
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 71–72. 
 24. Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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the Court decided International Shoe.
25
 We could say that citizenship 
provides the minimum contacts required by International Shoe, but it 
makes no sense conceptually to say that.
26
 Citizens owe duties to their 
state, including the obligation to appear in its courts. The Supreme Court 
did rule in Shaffer v. Heitner
27
 that jurisdiction historically based on the 
presence of property in the forum (in rem and quasi in rem) had to satisfy 
the International Shoe test, essentially making that kind of jurisdiction a 
species of minimum contacts jurisdiction. However, the Justices could not 
agree in Burnham v. Superior Court
28
 whether service of process on a 
transient defendant in the forum state was a different type of jurisdiction 
than minimum contacts jurisdiction or another species of that. Finally, we 
all should agree that jurisdiction based upon the defendant‘s consent is not 
a species of minimum contacts jurisdiction but rather a waiver of the due 
process right.
29
 
General jurisdiction is straightforward and noncontroversial when 
applied to explain jurisdiction over natural persons. It is the application to 
corporations that has generated uncertainty and disagreement. To better 
understand the scope of general jurisdiction over corporations, it is helpful 
to return to the explanation given by von Mehren and Trautman. They do 
not include general jurisdiction in their discussions about the variability of 
contacts leading to different results; that is their discussion of specific 
jurisdiction. Rather, they view general jurisdiction over a corporation as 
having the same certainty as jurisdiction based on the domicile of a natural 
person. As they explain: 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–64 (1940) (citizenship and domicile); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724–25 (1877) (presence and consent). 
 26. The Supreme Court created the minimum contacts test in International Shoe as a way to 
analyze jurisdiction over non-residents, not citizens. As the Court wrote, ―due process requires only 
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum,‖ minimum contacts are necessary. 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added). 
 27. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 28. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 29. Consent is not as simple a concept as often described by the Supreme Court. The Court has 
said that the due process clause is the only source of the constitutional personal jurisdiction protection, 
that due process creates a personal right, and that the right may therefore be waived. See, e.g., Ins. 
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). The statement of due process 
as the sole source of the right was made in the context of explaining consent. Non-resident defendants 
were protected by personal jurisdiction limitations long before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted. Those protections emanated from the full faith and credit clause and historical geographic 
limitations on the reach of courts. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1020–22 (1983). Consent and waiver make sense in our national 
system of courts, even if due process is not the only source of personal jurisdiction limitations. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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[G]eneral adjudicatory jurisdiction over corporations and other legal 
persons could be exercised by the community with which the legal 
person had its closest and most continuing legal and factual 
connections. The community that chartered the corporation and in 
which it has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous 
to that of the community of a natural person‘s domicile and habitual 
residence. If a corporation‘s managerial and administrative center is 
in a state other than its state of incorporation, presumably general 
jurisdiction should exist in either community.
30
 
This is a simple rule for corporations, like the two bases of citizenship of a 
corporation for diversity purposes in federal court subject matter 
jurisdiction.
31
 
Why did the concept of general jurisdiction expand and become so 
uncertain when applied to corporations? The answer lies in International 
Shoe and in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
32
 (the only case 
in which the Supreme Court has upheld general jurisdiction over a 
corporation), and in the analysis of commentators who picked up on 
certain language in those cases. 
B. General Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
In discussing the ―presence‖ test for establishing personal jurisdiction 
over corporations, which it replaced with the minimum contacts test, the 
Court in International Shoe noted that in some cases, ―the continuous 
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such 
a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.‖33 This was a statement 
about early cases; it was neither a blessing of them nor a recognition that 
the same result would hold under the minimum contacts test. In discussing 
the application of the minimum contacts test, the Court did recognize what 
we label specific jurisdiction today: 
 
 
 30. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1141–42; see also Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer 
Haverkamp & Buck Logan, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 (1988) 
(―Domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business are paradigms of bases for general 
jurisdiction.‖); Twitchell, supra note 18, at 667 (―[G]eneral jurisdiction should be retained solely at a 
defendant‘s home base‖). 
 31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006). 
 32. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 33. Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/4
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The exercise of [the privilege of conducting activities in a state] 
may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise 
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a 
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit 
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be 
undue.
34
  
Today we would classify International Shoe as an application of specific 
jurisdiction since the suit arose from a claim of nonpayment of 
unemployment contributions owed as a result of International Shoe having 
employees in the state.
35
 In evaluating the connections between the 
defendant and the forum, the Court did categorize International Shoe‘s in-
state activities as ―systematic and continuous throughout the years in 
question.‖36 However, the Court did not use the term ―systematic and 
continuous‖ as it came to be used later in the general jurisdiction cases. No 
one could view the limited ―systematic and continuous‖ activities in 
International Shoe as coming anywhere near to justifying what we would 
label general jurisdiction today.
37
 Consequently, International Shoe does 
little to help us understand the proper scope of general jurisdiction. 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. involved a suit in Ohio 
state court against a Philippine corporation that was carrying on all of its 
corporate and managerial activities in Ohio while the Philippines were 
occupied during World War II.
38
 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
failed to issue her stock certificates and pay her dividends. Because the 
cause of action did not arise in Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
concluded that it would violate due process under the International Shoe 
standards if it asserted jurisdiction in the case. The Ohio court wrote that 
the Supreme Court in International Shoe ―apparently has distinguished 
[Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., a well known decision by the New York 
Court of Appeals allowing jurisdiction when the cause of action did not 
arise in New York,] and indicated that it would not go to the extent which 
the New York Court of Appeals went in sustaining the service of process 
 
 
 34. Id. at 319. 
 35. As the Court said, ―The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those very [in-state] 
activities.‖ Id. at 320. 
 36. Id. at 320. 
 37. As any first-year law student knows, International Shoe‘s ―systematic and continuous‖ 
activities in Washington State consisted of eleven to thirteen salesmen who lived and worked in 
Washington, displaying shoe samples, sometimes in rental display rooms and facilities, and soliciting 
orders. Id. at 313–14. 
 38. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in that case.‖39 In its opinion in Perkins, the United States Supreme Court 
focused on the facts that demonstrated that the mining company had been 
managing all its business out of the president‘s home in Ohio since the war 
began in the Philippines.
40
 Although the plaintiff sued in April 1947, 
nearly two years after the war had ended in the Pacific, the president was 
still supervising affairs from Ohio.
41
 This suit against the mining company 
was the latest in a succession of lawsuits brought by Perkins beginning in 
the 1930s to obtain the stock and dividends, the ownership of which was 
contested by Perkins‘s ex-husband since their divorce.42 
The Supreme Court identified the lawsuit as involving a cause of action 
that ―did not arise in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation‘s 
activities there.‖43 This conclusion seems correct as the plaintiff‘s claim to 
the stock and dividends arose upon her divorce in the 1930s in the 
Philippines when the defendant was operating in the Philippines and 
before it opened the Ohio office. Although the cause of action did not arise 
out of Ohio activities, it was related to Ohio in this sense: According to the 
plaintiff, the obligation to issue her share certificates and pay dividends 
continued during the time the defendant maintained its Ohio office. The 
defendant could have fulfilled its obligations to the plaintiff from its Ohio 
office. Furthermore, her claim was a corporate law claim, and all the 
 
 
 39. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 98 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ohio 1951). The Court of Appeals 
in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917), based jurisdiction on these activities: 
―In brief, the defendant maintains an office in this state under the direction of a sales agent, with eight 
salesmen, and with clerical assistance, and through these agencies systematically and regularly solicits 
and obtains orders which result in continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York.‖ Id. at 917. 
 40. 342 U.S. at 447–48. 
 41. In May 1946 the company began to rebuild its mining operations in the Philippines. The 
Chief of Staff was organizing these activities from Manila, while the company‘s purchasing agent was 
arranging the purchases of new equipment from San Francisco. The president continued to supervise 
all activities from Ohio until he returned to the Philippines in August 1947. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co., 95 N.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).  
 42. Perkins had sued in the Philippines and in state courts in New York, California, and Ohio 
prior to the lawsuit in question. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438 & n.1. When she brought her suit against the 
mining company in Ohio state court, the courts of the Philippines had reopened. Philip B. Kurland, 
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from 
Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 602 (1958). Perkins was living in 
Connecticut when she sued. Brief for the Respondent at 3, Perkins, 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (No. 85), 
1951 WL 81988. As a result, she would have found a U.S. forum much more convenient than a 
Philippine court. Some commentators explained Perkins as a case of ―jurisdiction by necessity,‖ in 
which the availability of only a foreign court plays a factor in favor of jurisdiction in a U.S. court. See 
Twitchell, supra note 18, at 626 n.75; Kathleen Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The 
Judicial Process and State Court Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 917, 940; Kurland, supra, at 602. 
The Supreme Court did not use that factor in its analysis, however, and Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408 (1984), seems to have foreclosed any notion of 
jurisdiction by necessity. See infra text accompanying notes 171–73. 
 43. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438. 
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corporate activities of the defendant were being carried out in Ohio during 
and in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. 
Nonetheless, the Court characterized the cause of action as not relating to 
the defendant‘s activities in Ohio,44 so Perkins became the only post-
International Shoe case in which the Court upheld jurisdiction based on 
the theory of general jurisdiction.  
The use of general jurisdiction in Perkins is consistent with von 
Mehren and Trautman‘s notion that the ―community‖ of the corporate 
defendant is the appropriate forum for general jurisdiction.
45
 The corporate 
offices of the mining company were located in Ohio; all the managerial 
and corporate activities were carried out or supervised from that office. As 
von Mehren and Trautman write: 
Ohio appears to have been, among the forums open to the plaintiff, 
the one with which the defendant corporation at the time had the 
most sustained and significant contacts. Given the facts of the case, 
the decision can be regarded as approving the forum utilized as a 
surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office.
46
 
If the Court in Perkins had just analyzed the issue as a determination of 
the mining company‘s headquarters for purposes of establishing 
jurisdiction, the case would not have supported an expansive view of 
general jurisdiction. However, the apparent broad scope of general 
jurisdiction and the uncertainty over its limits stem from the analysis used 
by the Court in Perkins. The Court framed its question as follows:  
whether, as a matter of federal due process, the business done in 
Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently 
substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a 
cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of 
action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in 
Ohio.
47
 
To answer that question, the Court turned to the historical summary in 
International Shoe of the earlier cases that applied the presence test. The 
court in Perkins said that allowing jurisdiction for an unrelated cause of 
 
 
 44. See id.  
 45. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 46. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1144. The Supreme Court in a case decided thirty 
years later, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), explained the holding in Perkins 
the same way: general jurisdiction was upheld because ―Ohio was the corporation‘s principal, if 
temporary, place of business . . . .‖ Id. at 780 n.11. 
 47. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. 
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action ―conforms to the realistic reasoning in International Shoe Co.: 
‗there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations 
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.‖48 The ―instances‖ of jurisdiction over unrelated 
causes of actions included Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
49
 which the 
Supreme Court of Ohio thought had been distinguished by the Court in 
International Shoe.
50
 Although the Court in International Shoe only used 
Tauza and other cases to illustrate the state of the law under the presence 
test, the Court in Perkins viewed International Shoe as endorsing that 
result. Rather than limiting jurisdiction over unrelated claims to the states 
of incorporation and headquarters, the Court focused on the need for 
―continuous corporate operations‖ in the forum state and developed what 
has become the test for general jurisdiction: the need for ―continuous and 
systematic‖ corporate activities.51 In upholding the constitutionality of 
jurisdiction in Perkins, the Court concluded that the president of the 
mining company ―carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic 
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the 
company.‖52 After the Court decided Perkins, courts and commentators 
recognized general jurisdiction as triggered by the continuous and 
systematic activities requirement when the cause of action did not arise in 
the forum.
53
 
The minimum contacts test, although uncertain and malleable, is a 
sensible combination of two factors in order to assess personal 
jurisdiction: the defendant‘s connections to the forum state and the 
relationship between the cause of action and the forum. More of one factor 
helps make up for less of the other.
54
 General jurisdiction can be invoked 
when the relationship between the cause of action and the forum is at its 
lowest point—when it does not ―arise‖ out of or ―relate to‖ the forum 
 
 
 48. Id. at 446 (citation omitted) (quoting Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 
(1945)). 
 49. 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917). 
 50. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 98 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ohio 1951). 
 51. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445–46. 
 52. Id. at 448. 
 53. For example, the Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, states that ―[a] state has power to 
exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which does business in the state with respect to 
causes of action that do not arise from the business . . . if this business is so continuous and substantial 
as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdiction.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47(2) (1971). 
 54. See William M. Richman, Review Essay, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (1984) (book 
review). 
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activities, according to the Court in Perkins.
55
 One would think that when 
the relationship between the cause of action and the forum was at its 
lowest, the connections between the defendant and the forum would have 
to be at its highest. That is what von Mehren and Trautman‘s requirement 
of either state of incorporation or state of headquarters would do. It is hard 
to conceive of another state having a closer relationship with a corporation 
than the state that created the legal existence of the corporation (and that 
continues to govern it) and the state from which the corporation conducts 
its activities. By requiring ―continuous and systematic‖ business as a 
condition for personal jurisdiction, the Court in Perkins created an ill-
defined standard that left open the possibility of jurisdiction in states that 
are not places of incorporation or headquarters. In effect, the Court in 
Perkins returned to the corporate presence test as the test for general 
jurisdiction. Asking whether a corporation‘s business is continuous and 
systematic enough to permit a state to litigate an unrelated cause of action 
is very close to asking whether the corporation‘s activities are sufficient 
enough for a court to declare that a corporation is present in the forum and 
so amenable to suit on an unrelated cause of action. Yet, the Court crafted 
the minimum contacts test in International Shoe to replace the presence 
test. Perkins brought presence, under a new name, back into the doctrine.  
The requirement of continuous and systematic business for general 
jurisdiction leads to too much uncertainty. Is Dell subject to suit in every 
state for out-of-state causes of action because its sales of computers in 
every state are so great as to constitute continuous and systematic 
business? Same for Anheuser-Busch InBev because it sells so much beer 
in every state? If the answer is yes, the need for minimum contacts would 
disappear in suits against most or at least many modern corporations that 
serve a national market. This would effectively make personal jurisdiction 
meaningless as a due process protection for national corporations. 
Furthermore, general jurisdiction permits a forum to litigate any unrelated 
cause of action.
56
 Does this mean that a Russian brewery could sue 
Anheuser-Busch InBev in a state court in Maine for slander based on a 
comment the president made in a speech at a trade fair in Moscow, so long 
as the corporation‘s sales of beer in Maine constituted continuous and 
 
 
 55. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438. 
 56. Charles W. ―Rocky‖ Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: 
A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to 
Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 156 (2005) (―The essential distinction between general 
and specific jurisdiction, then, is the extent of the state‘s authority over the defendant, i.e., whether the 
defendant is amenable to all claims in the forum or whether the forum‘s adjudicative power is limited 
to those claims related to the defendant‘s forum activities.‖). 
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systematic business? These kinds of questions illustrate the uncertainty 
over the scope of general jurisdiction under the Perkins approach.  
The only two general jurisdiction cases decided by the Supreme Court 
after Perkins go a long way toward limiting general jurisdiction to what 
von Mehren and Trautman envisioned. In Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol),
57
 the Court rejected a claim of general 
jurisdiction in a suit brought in Texas state court against a Colombian 
corporation stemming from a helicopter crash in Peru. The defendant‘s 
helicopter had crashed in Peru killing United States citizens, whose 
representatives brought the wrongful death action.
58
 Most of the 
defendant‘s contacts stemmed from its dealings with Bell Helicopter. In a 
seven year period, leading up to the filing of the lawsuit, the defendant 
purchased about 80 percent of its fleet of helicopters, parts, and 
accessories for more than $4 million from Bell. It sent pilots to Texas for 
training by Bell and some management staff for familiarization and 
technical consulting.
59
 Finally, the chief executive officer of the defendant 
flew to Texas to negotiate a contract to provide helicopter services for the 
employer of the workers who died in the crash.
60
 In ruling against 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court explained that the defendant‘s dealings in 
Texas were not the kind of continuous and systematic contacts that 
Perkins required for general jurisdiction. As part of its analysis, the Court 
focused on the relevance of the defendant‘s purchases of goods and 
services in Texas: ―we hold that mere purchases, even if occurring at 
regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State‘s assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action 
not related to those purchase transactions.‖61 
One could interpret ―mere‖ purchases to mean ―small or slight,‖ 
meaning that the amount spent by Helicol in Texas was insufficient to 
trigger general jurisdiction and that considerably greater purchases could 
lead to jurisdiction. Would the result be different if the ―mere‖ purchases 
 
 
 57. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 58. Id. at 410. 
 59. Id. at 411. 
 60. Id. at 410–11. 
 61. Id. at 418. The Court cited a pre-International Shoe case for this proposition, Rosenberg 
Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923). Like Tauza, Rosenberg Bros. was cited in 
International Shoe as part of the Court‘s explanation of jurisdiction over corporations under the 
presence test. See Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). However, just as the Court 
in Perkins took the reference to Tauza to mean approval of that precedent, the Court in Helicol took 
the reference to Rosenberg Bros. to be at least tacit approval. The Helicol Court explained that the 
―Court in International Shoe acknowledged and did not repudiate its holding in Rosenberg.‖ Helicol, 
466 U.S. at 418.  
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were $100,000 or $1 million per month? If the word mere means a small 
amount, that should be the result. However, a better interpretation is that 
purchases alone, no matter how large in amount, will never support 
general jurisdiction.
62
 If the general jurisdiction test requires looking for 
continuous and systematic business activity in the forum, it is difficult to 
understand why purchases cannot be business activity while sales 
presumably can. A sale and a purchase are two sides of a business 
transaction, and they often involve other components, like negotiation, 
performance, warranties, and payment. The case did involve a foreign 
defendant buying equipment and services from a company in Texas, 
prompting the solicitor general to argue against jurisdiction out of a desire 
to not discourage foreign companies from buying United States products 
for fear of suit in our courts.
63
 However, the majority opinion did not 
mention a balance of payments concern nor limit their discussion of ―mere 
purchases‖ to purchases by foreign defendants. The holding in Helicol was 
a sensible limitation of the continuous and systematic activities standard, 
but the strange differentiation between purchases and sales was 
troublesome. The opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires helps resolve that 
problem. 
The opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires ended the inconsistency 
between purchases and sales in the forum. After quoting Helicol for the 
proposition that mere purchases are not enough to create general 
jurisdiction, the Court wrote: 
We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held 
insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners‘ tires 
sporadically made in North Carolina through intermediaries. Under 
the sprawling view of general jurisdiction urged by respondents and 
embraced by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, any substantial 
manufacturer or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any 
claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed. 
 Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is 
not a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners 
to general jurisdiction. Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole 
wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in 
 
 
 62. The Court also wrote that Rosenberg Bros. ―makes clear that purchases and related trips, 
standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State‘s assertion of jurisdiction.‖ 466 U.S. at 417 
(emphasis added). 
 63. Id. at 425 n.3; see also Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of 
Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 929 (1985). 
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no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated connections to 
the State fall far short of . . . ―the continuous and systematic general 
business contacts‖ necessary to empower North Carolina to 
entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that 
connects them to the State.
64
 
This section of the opinion equates sales with purchases as an 
insufficient basis for general jurisdiction. One could argue that although 
the meager sales ―sporadically made in North Carolina‖ do not support 
general jurisdiction, a record of much greater sales in a state could 
establish general jurisdiction. That argument would also be consistent with 
the Court‘s continued use of the amorphous continuous and systematic 
requirement. However, the Court‘s intention appears to disqualify sales as 
a basis for general jurisdiction, in harmony with its disqualification of 
purchases in Helicol. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court‘s standard 
in Goodyear of looking at whether the forum is the defendant‘s ―home.‖65 
In the companion personal jurisdiction opinion released the same day, J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
66
 two opinions explained general 
jurisdiction, one by stating that it exists in the state where a defendant is 
incorporated or has its principle place of business, and the other, that it 
exists at the ―home‖ of a corporate defendant.67 None of the opinions in 
Nicastro referred to general jurisdiction as requiring continuous and 
systematic business. It is fair to conclude after Goodyear and Nicastro that 
there must be more than sales or purchases in the forum state in order to 
create general jurisdiction, regardless of the amount of sales and 
purchases. It took the Supreme Court over sixty years from the decision in 
Perkins to limit the broad interpretations that arose from the ill-defined 
 
 
 64. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856–57 (2011) 
(citations omitted). 
 65. Some commentators have focused on the Court‘s use of the phrase ―essentially at home‖ 
when it first mentioned this limitation, on page 2851. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of 
“Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012). Later in the opinion the 
Court used the phrase ―fairly regarded as at home,‖ 131 S. Ct. at 2854, and then ―in no sense at home,‖ 
id. at 2857. In Nicastro, the plurality did not use the word ―home‖ in describing general jurisdiction 
over a corporation, but rather referred to general jurisdiction arising in the states of incorporation and 
of the location of the principle place of business. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 
2787 (2011). The dissent (written by Justice Ginsburg, the author of the opinion in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires) used the term ―at home.‖ Id. at 2797. Regardless of the terminology one wishes to focus on, the 
―home‖ of a corporation surely includes the state of incorporation and the state where its principle 
place of business is located. Later cases will have to flesh out whether other corporate activities will 
qualify additional states as the home. See, e.g., Stein, supra, at 533, 545–48.  
 66. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 67. See supra note 65. 
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standard of continuous and systematic conduct and to espouse the limited 
meaning of general jurisdiction advanced by von Mehren and Trautman.
68
  
This clarification of the use of the term general jurisdiction in the case 
law is a welcome simplification of how we describe one form of personal 
jurisdiction. Determining whether general jurisdiction exists over a 
corporation is an easier task after the doctrinal change in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires from ―continuous and systematic business‖ to ―at home.‖ 
However, the change in the standard also limited the reach of general 
jurisdiction. The unanswered question is whether the doctrinal 
improvement has made it harder to get jurisdiction in deserving cases that 
would have been decided under the ―continuous and systematic business‖ 
standard. I suspect that courts will continue to find jurisdiction to exist but 
will expand the use of the specific jurisdiction label. Von Mehren and 
Trautman expected personal jurisdiction to continue to expand when they 
wrote their article, and they saw the expansion to come in the specific 
jurisdiction cases: ―[S]pecific jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and 
form a considerably more significant part of the scene. At the same time, 
the contours of present forms of specific jurisdiction will be modified 
substantially and entirely new forms may emerge.‖69  
It is important to remember that von Mehren and Trautman‘s division 
of all instances of personal jurisdiction into two categories of specific and 
general jurisdiction was only a model designed to help with the 
understanding of personal jurisdiction. Whether a court can assert personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident depends on the application of 
International Shoe and the case law that followed, not on the model. Once 
a court determines that personal jurisdiction exists, the model classifies it 
as general jurisdiction if the cause of action was completely unrelated to 
the forum. Otherwise it would be classified as specific jurisdiction. We 
could create different models of personal jurisdiction to replace von 
Mehren and Trautman‘s if that were more helpful, which would not 
change the law but only the classification scheme.
70
 However, the model‘s 
 
 
 68. This limitation on general jurisdiction brings the law of the United States closer to the 
European Union Regulations that limit general jurisdiction to the state of domicile of the defendant. 
See Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12/3–4) art. 2 (EC).  
 69. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1164; see also id. at 1166 (predicting that specific 
jurisdiction will ―prosper and mature‖ and ―be extended and refined‖); id. at 1141 n.47 (―With the 
emergence of specific jurisdiction, limited general jurisdiction has become increasingly less palatable; 
its legitimate functions are more appropriately performed by some form of specific jurisdiction.‖).  
 70. For example, Linda Simard has proposed a model with a third form of jurisdiction, which she 
labeled ―hybrid‖ jurisdiction. Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General 
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 (1998). I 
find a three-part classification scheme more useful, albeit a different one. A category as broad as 
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adoption into the case law makes the definitions of the two forms of 
jurisdiction crucial. If one believes that all legal assertions of personal 
jurisdiction must be either general or specific and at the same time has a 
narrow perception of either or both of those types of jurisdiction, it would 
be possible to conclude that jurisdiction is lacking even though the case 
law would support it. 
Many cases that courts have labeled as general jurisdiction could just 
as well be classified as specific jurisdiction. Mary Twitchell‘s examination 
of reported cases brought against non-American defendants between 1995 
and 2000 showed the significance of the cause of action in cases labeled as 
general jurisdiction: 
 In almost half of the cases finding general jurisdiction based on 
the defendant‘s forum business activities, the claim was directly 
related to those forum contacts. In several additional cases the claim 
bore some relationship to the defendant‘s forum contacts, but the 
courts found general jurisdiction and did not resolve the possibly 
more difficult specific jurisdiction question. In very few cases, the 
claim was fairly distant from the defendant‘s forum contacts, and in 
only two cases was it totally unrelated. Because related-claim 
situations are so common, they may indeed play a significant role in 
broadening the circumstances in which courts find doing-business 
jurisdiction.
71
  
My examination of the general jurisdiction cases between August 2003 
and August 2008 is consistent with Twitchell‘s findings: only a small 
percentage of general jurisdiction cases actually involve causes of action 
that are completely unrelated to the forum.
72
 
 
 
specific jurisdiction has become fails to provide the analytical assistance that should come from a 
model. I prefer a model in which specific jurisdiction is not used to identify all forms of jurisdiction 
that are not general jurisdiction. A more useful definition of specific jurisdiction would limit it to 
instances when the relationship between the cause of action and the forum is at its highest (as when a 
non-forum resident has had an auto accident in the state) and when the connections between the 
defendant and the forum are at their lowest (as when that non-resident had no connection to the forum 
other than the trip when the accident occurred). See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). This 
would result in general and specific jurisdiction describing extremes at which it was easy to obtain 
jurisdiction, with the rest of the universe of personal jurisdiction following somewhere between those 
extremes. These cases between the easy extremes, in which there was some relationship between the 
defendant, the cause of action, and the state are the interesting and debatable ones.  
 71. Twitchell, supra note 22, at 191–93 (footnotes omitted). 
 72. Two research assistants of mine used Westlaw to look at all the opinions between August 
2003 and August 2008 in which courts used the term general jurisdiction. Of the approximately two 
thousand lower court decisions, only about twenty involved a cause of action with no connections to 
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The real answer to the effect of Goodyear Dunlop Tires lies in the 
breadth of specific jurisdiction. As all the Justices in Helicol recognized, 
specific jurisdiction encompasses cases in which the cause of action arises 
out of or is related to activities in the forum.
73
 Von Mehren and Trautman 
defined specific jurisdiction to permit litigation ―with respect to issues 
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes 
jurisdiction to adjudicate.‖74 The concepts of ―related to‖ and ―connected 
with‖ can be quite broad. Thus, a defendant‘s business in the forum that is 
connected in some way with the cause of action will in appropriate cases 
sustain jurisdiction. This kind of approach follows from the combination 
of the defendant‘s connections and the cause of action‘s connections in the 
minimum contacts test. When the cause of action does not ―arise out of or 
relate to‖ the forum activities, the connections between the defendant and 
the forum have to be at their highest—hence the ―at home‖ requirement of 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires. Likewise, when the cause of action is somehow 
related to the forum, the defendant‘s connection to the forum can be 
something less than having its ―home‖ there. As a result, the extent and 
type of business conducted by the defendant in the forum state remains an 
important factor. The need for some connection between the cause of 
action and the forum eliminates the extreme applications of doing business 
jurisdiction.
75
 It also allows jurisdiction in cases in which a cause of action 
occurring outside the forum has some connection to that state, even an 
attenuated connection, in the context of the defendant‘s in-state business. 
For example, when an accident occurs outside the forum state, there will 
sometimes be solicitation in or other reaching out to the forum, directly by 
the defendant itself or through an unrelated agent that will suffice for the 
―related to‖ requirement.76  
 
 
the forum. See also Rhodes, supra note 20, at 820–28 (discussing numerous lower court general 
jurisdiction opinions that also intermingle concepts of specific jurisdiction). 
 73. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 409, 420 (1984). 
 74. von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1136. 
 75. For example, a suit against a corporation in California for a tort that occurred in Albania 
cannot be based on the corporation‘s continuous and systematic business in California, although that 
might have been possible before. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 76. Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982), is a case that nicely 
illustrates how what seems to be jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic business may 
actually hinge on the cause of action‘s connection to the forum through in-state business. That case 
found jurisdiction over a doctor who allegedly committed malpractice in a surgery outside the forum 
state because the hospital, acting as the doctor‘s agent, advertised for surgical services in the forum. Id. 
at 835–36. (Lemke is the case Linda Simard chose to start her proposal for a third type of jurisdiction 
in Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It 
Constitutional?, supra note 70.) For another example, but one involving a tort occurring outside the 
United States, see Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357 (11th 
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I think that the greatest risk of undesirable results from the shrinkage of 
general jurisdiction involves suits stemming from torts and other injuries 
occurring outside the United States. In the past, many courts have used 
general jurisdiction as the basis for adjudicating these types of claims. If 
the ―related to‖ requirement is interpreted narrowly, injured citizens will 
have to sue abroad, losing the benefits of United States tort law, the 
contingency fee system, and the other unique aspects of our legal system. 
Those are much harsher consequences than having to litigate in one state 
over a tort occurring in another. However, the obstacles that United States 
citizens may face as a result of Goodyear Dunlop Tires pale in comparison 
to the impediments created by Nicastro for citizens injured in the United 
States by foreign tortfeasors. 
II. STREAM OF COMMERCE 
Unlike Goodyear Dunlop Tires, the opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro
77
 did not clarify an uncertainty over the limits of personal 
jurisdiction. Rather they reinforced disagreements over the validity of 
―stream of commerce‖ as a way to get jurisdiction and made it harder for 
victims of torts to sue where they were injured. 
A. The Three Opinions in Nicastro 
In Nicastro, the Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey could not assert 
jurisdiction over a British corporation that manufactured a large metal-
shearing machine that cut off Robert Nicastro‘s fingers as he was using it 
in New Jersey while working for a metal recycler.
78
 Nicastro‘s employer 
had purchased the three-ton machine for $24,900 in 1995 from the Ohio 
distributor for the defendant.
79
 J. McIntyre did not sell its machines in 
New Jersey or in any state except for Ohio, for that matter. It sold its 
machines to its Ohio distributor, which in turn marketed the machines 
throughout the United States. The Ohio distributor, the sole distributor of 
J. McIntyre products in the United States, was a corporation separate and 
 
 
Cir. 2006) finding jurisdiction in Florida over a Bahamian corporation as a result of the defendant‘s 
use of a Florida agent for booking and advertising for their Bahamian resort, among other contacts. See 
infra text accompanying notes 166–67 for support for specific jurisdiction in Ohio over J. McIntyre.  
 77. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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independent from the British corporation.
80
 J. McIntyre engaged the 
distributor to sell to customers throughout the United States.
81
 As part of 
its U.S. marketing efforts, J. McIntyre‘s president regularly attended and 
exhibited products at the annual United States scrap metal industry trade 
show, which had been taking place from 1990 through 2005.
82
 It was at an 
annual convention in Las Vegas that Nicastro‘s employer learned of 
McIntyre‘s metal-shearing machine.83 Although J. McIntyre tried to sell its 
products to any customer anywhere in the United States by using its Ohio 
distributor, the personal jurisdiction issue arose from the absence of J. 
McIntyre‘s sales in and marketing efforts directed specifically toward New 
Jersey. Six Justices, writing two opinions, ruled against Nicastro on the 
personal jurisdiction issue. Because the Ohio distributor was bankrupt,
84
 
Nicastro‘s only option left after the Supreme Court opinion was to bring 
his products liability action against J. McIntyre in the British courts. 
A plurality of four Justices in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy 
supported the modification of the ―stream of commerce‖ theory that was 
initially proposed by four Justices in 1987 in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court.
85
 The plurality in Asahi concluded that a nonresident 
defendant‘s putting a product into the stream of commerce was not 
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction in the state where the product was 
sold at retail and subsequently caused injury.
86
 Concerned about the need 
for a nonresident defendant to ―purposefully avail‖ itself of the forum 
state, the Asahi plurality advanced a stream of commerce ―plus‖ rule in 
which the defendant would need to have taken some additional act 
directed toward the forum, such as special product design for use in the 
forum or advertising in the forum.
87
 Likewise the plurality in Nicastro 
 
 
 80. The Ohio distributor was named McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. even though it was a 
separate legal entity. It advertised itself as J. McIntyre‘s ―national distributor [and] ‗America‘s Link‘ 
to ‗Quality Metal Processing Equipment‘ from England.‖ Id. at 2796. 
 81. To achieve McIntyre UK‘s objective, i.e., ―to sell [its] machines to customers throughout the 
United States, the two companies [were acting] closely in concert with each other.‖ McIntyre UK 
never instructed its distributor to avoid certain States or regions of the country; rather, as just noted, 
the manufacturer engaged McIntyre America to attract customers ―from anywhere in the United 
States.‖ Id. at 2797 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The plurality said that the ―facts may 
reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed 
itself of the New Jersey market.‖ Id. at 2790. 
 82. Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 2795. 
 84. Id. at 2796 n.2. 
 85. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The plurality in Nicastro was composed of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O‘Connor, and 
Scalia made up the plurality in Asahi. 
 86. Id. at 112. 
 87. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1728 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1707 
 
 
 
 
emphasized the need ―to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is 
not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will 
reach the forum State.‖88 The plurality focused on the intent of the 
defendant as the crucial factor in its analysis.
89
 After reviewing the 
defendant‘s connections with the United States and its lack of activities in 
New Jersey, the plurality wrote:  
[T]he trial court found that the ―defendant does not have a single 
contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up 
in this state.‖ These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. 
market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed 
itself of the New Jersey market.
90
 
Like the plurality, the opinion of Justices Breyer and Alito concluded 
that the evidence did not show ―that the British Manufacturer 
‗purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities‘ 
within New Jersey.‖91 However, unlike the plurality, Justice Breyer‘s 
opinion focused on the ―single isolated sale‖ in New Jersey being 
ineffective in creating jurisdiction. Justice Breyer wrote:  
[T]he [Supreme] Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested 
that a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an 
adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of 
commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take 
place.
92
  
Because the concurrence saw nothing in the record beyond the single sale 
in New Jersey, it reached the same conclusion as the plurality of an 
absence of jurisdiction. Both the plurality and the concurrence expressed a 
fear that upholding jurisdiction in this case would open up jurisdiction 
over small manufacturers, both domestic and foreign, when their products 
caused injury in distant states.
93
 Justices Breyer and Alito differed from 
the plurality in two important aspects. First, they viewed their decision as 
 
 
 88. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
 89. See id. (―The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant‘s activities 
manifest an intention to submit to the power of the sovereign.‖); id. at 2791 (―At no time did petitioner 
engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of 
its laws.‖). 
 90. Id. at 2790 (citation omitted). 
 91. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
 92. Id.  
 93. See id. at 2790; id. at 2793. 
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breaking no new ground. The result was the product of ―no more than 
adhering to . . . precedents.‖94 Second, they were concerned that the ―strict 
rules‖ of the plurality might be inappropriate when new technology 
provides ways to conduct activities in the forum through world-wide 
computer sales and advertising on the Web, something that was not part of 
the case.
95
 
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Kagan 
and Sotomayor, reflects Justice Ginsburg‘s earlier career as an outstanding 
procedure scholar and displays a better understanding of the precedents 
than the other two opinions. Like the plurality, the dissent recognized that 
―McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market.‖96 Unlike 
the plurality, the dissent found the defendant‘s conduct to satisfy the 
―purposeful availment‖ requirement because the defendant targeted New 
Jersey sales when it tried to sell to customers throughout the United States. 
The dissent asked, ―How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its 
actions targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest 
destination for imports among all States of the United States and the 
largest scrap metal market?‖97 To show how the result in Nicastro was out 
of step with the prevailing approach to personal jurisdiction analysis in 
products liability cases involving foreign defendants, the dissent included 
an appendix of federal and state cases in which jurisdiction was held to 
exist over defendants that targeted a national market.
98
  
B. Critique of the Opinions  
The finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction in Nicastro is the worst 
result in any personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court in 
the modern era. It is absurd to think that a worker at a scrap yard in New 
Jersey has to bring a products liability suit in the United Kingdom when he 
loses fingers on his hand from an allegedly defective machine. Not only 
did the six Justices order an unfair result; they also showed a failure to 
understand the personal jurisdiction precedent.  
The central question in any personal jurisdiction case is whether the 
court has the authority to require people to appear in its courts. In 
assessing the limits placed on that jurisdiction by the due process clause, 
 
 
 94. Id. at 2792. 
 95. Id. at 2793. 
 96. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2802 n.14, 2804–06. 
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the current law requires a determination of whether the minimum contacts 
standard is satisfied. Whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the 
forum state is only one aspect of the process of examining the relationship 
between the defendant and the forum and between the cause of action and 
the forum in order to conclude whether minimum contacts exist.
99
 
Purposeful availment has not replaced minimum contacts as the due 
process standard. Nonetheless, the four Justices in Asahi and the four 
Justices in Nicastro raised the purposeful availment requirement to a 
prominence it does not deserve under the precedents. It is important to 
remember that the Court first articulated the purposeful availment 
requirement in Hanson v. Denckla,
100
 an unusual case in which the Court 
faced two conflicting state supreme court opinions. The Florida Supreme 
Court invalidated a Delaware trust using Florida law, while the Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld the trust under Delaware law.
101
 Most scholars 
believe that the Florida court used a contorted interpretation of its own 
choice-of-law rules to reach a result erroneous under trust law 
principles.
102
 Reviewing that aspect of the case would have involved 
thorny full faith and credit issues. Rather than reversing the Florida 
Supreme Court on the choice-of-law issue, the United States Supreme 
Court turned to personal jurisdiction as a way to resolve the problem. The 
Court gave effect to the Delaware court‘s ruling by finding a lack of 
personal jurisdiction in the Florida court over an indispensable party, the 
Delaware bank trustee.
103
 Although commentators thought the outcome to 
be fair, most were troubled by the Court‘s personal jurisdiction analysis.104 
 
 
 99. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 190 (1998) (―[T]he Court has regularly added new 
factors in a process of gradual accumulation, each addition aggravating the test‘s ambiguity and 
complexity.‖). For example, another factor is whether an out-of-state defendant caused an ―effect‖ in 
the forum. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).  
 100. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 101. Id. at 235. 
 102. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in 
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 142–50 (1976) (explaining the choice of law and full faith 
and credit issues); von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1175 (calling the Florida court‘s use of trust law 
―extreme and virtually unsupportable‖).  
 103. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 250–54. 
 104. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 241, 244 (―In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren reached the fair result . . . , but by a 
line of analysis that in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to 
relate.‖); Kirgis, supra note 102, at 144 (―In so holding, the Court opended itself up to considersable 
scholarly criticism . . . .‖). 
 The Delaware judgment seemed fairer than the Florida one because it not only upheld the settlor‘s 
intentions, it also resulted in an approximate equal division of the estate among her three daughters. 
The Florida decision would have effectively written one daughter out of the estate. See Allan Erbsen, 
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It was in this unusual case, with its controversial analysis of personal 
jurisdiction law used to get a fair result and to avoid a troublesome issue, 
that the purposeful availment requirement was born.
105
 Nonetheless, 
purposeful availment has become an accepted and important consideration 
in personal jurisdiction law. It is not, however, a difficult standard to meet 
in general. As the dissent in Nicastro pointed out by quoting from Burger 
King, the purposeful availment requirement ―simply ‗ensures that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, 
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.‘‖106 
There are some types of cases in which there would be jurisdiction over 
a non-resident who did not purposefully avail himself of the forum. The 
classic hypothetical of a shooting across a state line is one example.
107
 
Suppose two people are hiking in a state near the border of another state, 
and one shoots the other after the victim has crossed into the other state. 
Even if the shooter does not know that his victim has entered another state, 
the shooter could be haled into the courts of the state where the victim was 
shot for both criminal and civil proceedings. Likewise, if someone mails a 
letter bomb to an address in one state, but the letter is forwarded to an 
address in a second state, unbeknownst to the sender, the sender can be 
haled to the courts of the second state. In neither instance did the 
defendant purposefully avail himself of the forum state, because the 
defendant did not even know that the bullet or the bomb entered another 
state. Even though the mental element is lacking, there is nonetheless 
personal jurisdiction. The plurality in Nicastro recognized an exception for 
intentional torts from the purposeful availment requirement, but viewed 
that as irrelevant to a products liability lawsuit.
108
 
 
 
Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 16 n.61 (2010) (―The unstated motive for the Court‘s 
debatable jurisdictional analysis arguably may have been a sense that the Delaware judgment reached 
a better result than the Florida judgment, and thus the jurisdicitional inquiry yielded to an equitable 
comparison of the states‘ conflicting substantive laws.‖). 
 105. See Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. 
 106. J. McIntyre, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2801 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)); see also Weinberg, supra note 63, at 930 
(Denckla is one of the ―cases where the Court used minimum contacts limitations on state jurisdiction 
to serve the covert purpose of preventing application of forum law.‖). 
 107. See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 104, at 39–40.  
 108. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (―There may be exceptions, say, for instance, in cases 
involving an intentional tort. But the general rule is applicable in this products-liability case, and the 
so-called ‗stream-of-commerce‘ doctrine cannot displace it.‖) The need for purposeful availment is 
unique to U.S. law. For example, the EU Regulations on personal jurisdiction do not include that 
element. They allow jurisdiction in tort cases ―in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur.‖ Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12/4) art. 5(3) (EC).  
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Even when the purposeful availment test is applied to the facts of 
Nicastro, it is impossible to understand how J. McIntyre fails to satisfy 
that requirement. The British defendant engaged an American firm to sell 
to customers throughout the United States; it repeatedly reached potential 
customers from every state when it exhibited its machines at annual trade 
shows.
109
 The plurality distinguishes ―an intent to serve the U.S. market‖ 
from an intent to avail itself of the New Jersey market.
110
 If the defendant 
had told its distributor to sell to customers in all fifty states, would the 
plurality have found the requisite intention to target New Jersey? What if 
the defendant had told the distributor to sell to customers in Alabama and 
then listed the other forty-nine states by name? There is absolutely no 
difference between telling a distributor to serve the U.S. market and the 
two examples just mentioned. It is to focus on words and not meaning to 
see any difference in the three alternatives. The plurality would have been 
truer to the facts if it concluded that J. McIntyre had tried to reach 
customers in New Jersey, but then concluded that its attempts were 
insufficient to justify jurisdiction there. I would disagree with that 
conclusion, but at least it would be part of the usual debate over whether 
the connections with a forum in a lawsuit constitute minimum contacts. 
It is also troubling that both the plurality and concurrence justified their 
conclusion with examples of how small, local manufacturers would be 
haled across the country through expansive personal jurisdiction if 
Nicastro had come out differently. The plurality was concerned about the 
―owner of a small Florida farm [selling] crops to a large nearby distributor, 
for example, who might then distribute them to grocers across the 
country.‖111 The concurrence worried about a small Appalachian potter 
who sold his cups to a large distributor who resold one coffee mug to a 
buyer in Hawaii,
112
 and, on an international scale, a small Egyptian shirt 
maker whose products ended up in a distant state market.
113
 
I do not understand why these Justices were not concerned about the 
people injured by these manufacturers. People in business should buy 
liability insurance; that is just part of doing business. Their insurance 
companies can defend suits more easily than injured victims can sue at the 
home of the defendant. If a small organic farmer in Colorado sells her 
cantaloupes to a grocery store in St. Louis, through an intermediary food 
 
 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
 110. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 2794. 
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distributor, and a customer becomes infected with E. coli from the 
cantaloupe, I would expect that the customer could sue in St. Louis rather 
than needing to travel to Colorado. Likewise, if a small Egyptian shirt 
manufacturer sells a shirt that does not meet federal safety standards to the 
parents of a young boy in California, again through a national distributor, I 
would hope that the boy could sue in California for burns caused by the 
shirt catching fire rather than needing to go to Egypt. It is true that in 
many cases like this, there would be no reason to sue the manufacturer 
because the victim can sue the retailer and the distributor. But sometimes, 
as with the bankruptcy of J. McIntyre‘s Ohio distributor, the manufacturer 
is the only feasible defendant. 
The proper way to deal with small manufacturers who should not be 
forced to travel to distant states is to create an exception, not to change the 
entire rule out of a concern for the exceptional situation. The Supreme 
Court did that in Burger King, when it upheld jurisdiction but recognized 
that some types of similar cases should nonetheless come out 
differently.
114
 The best way to understand how to deal with the problem of 
the small manufacturer is to return to von Mehren and Trautman‘s famous 
article. 
In discussing the future of jurisdiction from their vantage point in 1966, 
von Mehren and Trautman emphasized certain characteristics of 
jurisdictional issues that are relevant to the concerns of the Justices in 
Nicastro. Von Mehren and Trautman thought the national or local 
character of activities was relevant to the design of jurisdictional rules: 
We suggest that the explanation [for a rule that favors jurisdiction 
where a tort occurred] lies in the multistate character of the 
defendant‘s activity giving rise to the underlying controversy, as 
compared with the localized nature of the plaintiff‘s. In addition, the 
defendant‘s activity foreseeably involved the risk of serious harm to 
individuals in communities other than his own. These two elements, 
taken together, and quite apart from considerations of litigational 
convenience, justify requiring the defendant to come to the 
plaintiff.
115
 
 
 
 114. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 (1985) (―[T]he Court of Appeals 
apparently believed that it was necessary to reject jurisdiction in this case as a prophylactic measure 
. . . . We share the Court of Appeals‘ broader concerns and therefore reject any talismanic 
jurisdictional formulas; ‗the facts of each case must [always] be weighed‘ in determining whether 
personal jurisdiction would comport with ‗fair play and substantial justice.‘‖). 
 115. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1167. 
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The authors wrote this to justify the result in Hess v. Pawloski,
116
 where 
the ―multistate character‖ of the defendant‘s conduct was driving from 
Massachusetts to Pennsylvania, something much more limited than the 
activities of companies who try to sell throughout the United States.  
Von Mehren and Trautman also recognized the problem of the small 
seller: 
Rather far-reaching bases for specific jurisdiction would then 
appear supportable with respect to certain classes of defendants, for 
example corporations whose economic activities and legal 
involvement were pervasively multistate, while the situations in 
which specific jurisdiction could appropriately be exercised would 
be far fewer when the defendant was a natural or legal person 
whose economic activities and legal involvements were essentially 
local. With respect to this latter class of defendants, additional 
litigational considerations of the kind present in Hess v. Pawloski 
should be required before specific jurisdiction is asserted.
117
 
J. McIntyre was a British corporation selling to the United States market, 
not someone whose activities were local. Under the model of von Mehren 
and Trautman, no special considerations are needed to sustain personal 
jurisdiction in New Jersey. Likewise, J. McIntyre is not at all like the 
small Florida farmer, the Appalachian potter, or even the Egyptian shirt 
maker, the kind of small firms that troubled the six Justices.
118
 
The opinion of Justices Breyer and Alito expressed concern over 
allowing jurisdiction when the defendant‘s first product to enter a state 
also causes injury in the state.
119
 That view leads to the uncertainty over 
how many machines the defendant must sell to customers in the forum 
state before jurisdiction would be permissible. Will three machines 
suffice? Five? Does it matter that J. McIntyre sells large machines that 
each cost $20,000 to $30,000, rather than vegetables, pottery, or shirts? 
There have been cases in which a single sale in the state supports 
jurisdiction, like McGee.
120
 It is true that there is something unsettling 
about allowing jurisdiction for a single, isolated sale. That is probably the 
 
 
 116. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 117. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1168. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13. 
 119. See J. McIntyre, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). The 
plurality noted that four machines may have been used in New Jersey, although ―the record suggests 
only one.‖ Id. at 2786. 
 120. McGee v. Int‘l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462 (1985), involved one contract (although it had a twenty-year term). 
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reason the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp.—the source of the stream of commerce theory—
noted that, although the record did not disclose Titan Valve‘s Illinois sales 
volume, ―it is a reasonable inference that [Titan Valve‘s] commercial 
transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use 
and consumption in [the] State.‖121 However, the way to deal with a 
concern over an isolated sale is to use the limitation contained in the 
Uniform Long Arm Statute and many state long arms: if an injury arises in 
a state from an isolated sale, jurisdiction is proper if the defendant derives 
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.
122
 This 
requirement, that the defendant carry on a multistate business, is an 
application of the approach suggested by von Mehren and Trautman. It is 
also a much better way to handle the isolated sale issue than the approach 
of the concurrence. 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the opinions in Nicastro is the 
claim by the concurrence that they are doing ―no more than adhering to . . . 
precedents.‖123 As the dissent so ably points out, that is not correct.124 In 
addition, to reconcile this outcome with those of the earlier cases, the 
concurrence often contorted the cases to fit the rule they wanted. For 
example, they disregard McGee when they say that ―[n]one of our 
precedents finds . . . a single isolated sale . . . sufficient‖ for jurisdiction.125 
They find support in World-Wide Volkswagen‘s rejection of the notion 
―that a defendant‘s amenability to suit ‗travel[s] with the chattel.‘‖126 
However, World-Wide Volkswagen essentially held that the stream of 
commerce ended with the retail sale and that a purchaser could not obtain 
jurisdiction in a state where the purchaser took the good.
127
 That case did 
not view Audi‘s sale of the car to the U.S. distributor as ending the stream 
of commerce, nor the sale by the national distributor to the three-state 
distributor. The stream ended when the New York car dealer sold the car 
to the plaintiff in New York. Likewise, the stream of commerce in 
Nicastro ended in New Jersey when the Ohio distributor sold the machine 
to Nicastro‘s employer. There was no ―travel[ing] [of] the chattel‖ in 
 
 
 121. 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961). 
 122. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800. See, e.g., New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 302(a).  
 123. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. 462 (one contract). 
 126. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)). 
 127. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295–99. 
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Nicastro. Perhaps the most glaring example is the concurrence‘s use of 
Asahi. The opinion states that  
the Court, in separate opinions [in Asahi], has strongly suggested 
that a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an 
adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of 
commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take 
place.
128
 
The concurrence uses Asahi as if it more than ―suggests‖; they use it as if 
it compels the result in Nicastro. Furthermore, it is an exaggeration to 
describe a statement to this effect in Asahi as ―strongly‖ suggesting. All 
nine Justices rejected jurisdiction in Asahi over a Japanese tire valve 
manufacturer sued for indemnity by a Taiwanese tire manufacturer. After 
the Taiwanese corporation settled with the plaintiff, all that was left in the 
lawsuit was the third-party claim involving two foreign corporations who 
engaged in their business transactions in Asia.
129
 Eight Justices applied the 
―fair play and substantial justice‖ part of the minimum contacts test to 
disallow jurisdiction. The language in Asahi relied on by the concurrence 
in Nicastro came from three opinions debating whether a plus factor 
should be grafted onto the stream of commerce test, all dicta in Asahi. Or, 
to put it the way the dissent in Nicastro did, ―the dueling opinions of 
Justice Brennan and Justice O‘Connor were hardly necessary‖ in Asahi.130 
I am also in complete agreement with the dissent‘s assessment of the 
concurrence‘s reliance on Asahi: ―To hold that Asahi controls this case 
would, to put it bluntly, be dead wrong.‖131 
How is it possible that Justice Breyer‘s opinion in Nicastro is so poorly 
grounded in the precedent he claims to follow? I have two hypotheses 
about the structure of the concurring opinion. First, it seems from the 
opinion that Justice Breyer is unsure of how personal jurisdiction should 
adapt to the world of the Web, where advertising and sales are global and 
intermediaries like Amazon.com play a major role.
132
 Perhaps some of the 
 
 
 128. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 129. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987). 
 130. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. 
 132. He expressed his concern as follows:  
The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not 
‗inten[d] . . . to have targeted the forum.‘ But what do those standards mean when a company 
targets the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of 
shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary 
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Justices thought these issues were part of the case when they granted 
certiorari. It seems fair to say that Justice Breyer is hesitant to modify 
existing personal jurisdiction law until the effects of global 
communications are clearer, a cautious approach to change at this time. 
One way to accomplish that is to say that the result in Nicastro is 
compelled by precedent, that the decision is not novel, and that the current 
law is not changed at all.  
A second possibility, not mutually exclusive with my first hypothesis, 
is that Justice Breyer worked hard to keep Justice Alito off the plurality 
opinion. If Justice Alito would have joined Justice Kennedy‘s opinion, the 
stream of commerce theory would have been limited greatly. The dicta of 
the four Justices in Asahi would have become the law in Nicastro. If it 
took a contorted, confusing opinion to hold Justice Alito, all of us 
believers in the stream of commerce theory owe deep gratitude to Justice 
Breyer. 
III. JURISDICTION IN A GLOBAL WORLD 
A. Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction Rights Are Not Applicable to 
Foreign Defendants 
With increasing global business and travel, there is sure to be a 
significant increase in tort litigation brought by United States citizens 
against non-citizens. The Court‘s application of the personal jurisdiction 
law in tort suits against foreign defendants has stacked the deck against 
citizen plaintiffs. In addition to the holding in Nicastro, the doctrine 
inherently favors foreign defendants because the plaintiff‘s interests may 
not be considered in determining if there are sufficient contacts. Only the 
connections between the forum and both the defendant and the cause of 
action are relevant.
133
 It is not until a court must decide if the contacts 
satisfy ―traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice‖ that the 
interest of the plaintiff becomes relevant. The defendants had such 
minimal connections to the forum state in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 
Nicastro, and Helicol that the Court never reached the stage of considering 
the plaintiffs‘ interest in those cases. As long as the Court continues to 
 
 
(say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company 
markets its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? 
Those issues have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this case.  
Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 133. Stein, supra note 65, at 541. 
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apply the current personal jurisdiction doctrine in cases involving foreign 
defendants, more and more citizen plaintiffs will be barred from the courts 
in the United States.  
In the cases involving personal jurisdiction over foreign parties,
134
 the 
Court has not analyzed whether the Constitution compels it to treat foreign 
defendants as it does domestic parties. It just took that to be appropriate. 
Similarly, it appears that no party has argued for different jurisdictional 
rules for foreign parties. Now is the time for the Court to determine if the 
Constitution obligates it to give the same rights to foreign defendants as it 
does to domestic parties.  
There are two constitutional provisions that limit the reach of state 
courts over defendants: full faith and credit and due process.
135
 Although 
the Supreme Court occasionally quotes Insurance Corp. of Ireland
136
 for 
the proposition that the due process clause is the only source of personal 
jurisdiction limitations, nothing has read out of the Constitution the 
limitations on state court jurisdiction that existed before the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
137
 A concern for the sovereignty of the states 
and for their equal role in our federal governance structure is carried out in 
full faith and credit. As every first-year law student knows from studying 
Pennoyer v. Neff,
138
 full faith and credit must be granted only to judgments 
rendered by courts with jurisdiction over the parties. As the Court in 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland made clear, state sovereignty does not play a 
direct role as a factor to be considered by the courts in analyzing personal 
 
 
 134. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Nicastro, 131 S. 
Ct. 2780; Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 
408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Until June 2011, only one Supreme 
Court case, Helicol, had denied U.S. plaintiffs a U.S. forum. The disputes in Asahi and Insurance Co. 
of Ireland were between foreign companies. Perkins, involving a foreign business being run out of 
Ohio, was like a lawsuit involving a resident non-citizen. See infra text accompanying note 148. 
 135. Cf. Erbsen, supra note 104, at 3–4 (―[C]ommentators cannot agree on the constitutional 
source of limits on state judicial authority, which in various contexts could be the Due Process Clause, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Commerce Clause, a constellation of clauses regulating 
federalism, or no clause.‖). 
 136. 456 U.S. 694.  
 137.  
The text of the Due Process Clause thus apparently did not alter the basic jurisdictional 
standard that existed prior to its adoption. Instead, as the Pennoyer Court admitted, the Clause 
codified prior ―rules and principles which have been established in our systems of 
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.‖ 
Erbsen, supra note 104, at 59 (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)); see also Wendy 
Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 741 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of full faith and credit). 
 138. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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jurisdictional issues.
139
 Rather, state sovereignty concerns are advanced as 
a byproduct of the application of the minimum contacts test. As I have 
explained elsewhere, state sovereignty requires that there be some 
connection between the defendant and the forum state or between the 
cause of action and the forum as a matter of constitutional law.
140
 That is 
why the Supreme Court requires minimum contacts and why personal 
jurisdiction cannot turn into something like interstate venue. However, 
notwithstanding the important role state sovereignty plays in personal 
jurisdiction, it has no bearing on cases brought against foreign 
defendants.
141
 When a Virginia resident dies in an auto accident in Paris, 
there is no issue of one state infringing another state‘s authority; only the 
sovereignty of Virginia and France are relevant. Likewise, when a British-
made good injures someone in New Jersey, the only relevant sovereigns 
are New Jersey and Great Britain. As a result, the Supreme Court should 
craft a version of personal jurisdiction rights for non-citizens free of 
sovereignty concerns, which would vary the protections of non-citizens in 
a number of different ways. For example, the concept of purposeful 
availment rests on state sovereignty underpinnings. It is part of the needed 
connections with the forum state that make personal jurisdiction 
constitutional. To the extent that those connections are unnecessary in 
suits against non-citizens, purposeful availment would no longer be 
constitutionally compelled by sovereignty concerns.  
This leads to the question of whether the due process clause would still 
compel the same doctrine for non-citizens, with factors like purposeful 
availment retaining their importance. The Supreme Court has ruled on 
numerous occasions that people who are not citizens do not have the same 
constitutional rights as citizens.
142
 The status of citizenship brings 
constitutional protections unavailable to outsiders. Just as citizens have 
more rights than non-citizens, resident aliens have more rights than non-
resident foreign nationals. In terms of the protections afforded by the due 
process clause, the Court has ruled that citizens and resident aliens are 
 
 
 139. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702. 
 140. Drobak, supra note 29, at 1015. 
 141. Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment 
on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669, 688–89 
(―Obviously, states are under no constitutional obligation to preserve the sovereign status of foreign 
nations; therefore, the considerations of federalism raised in World-Wide Volkswagen are irrelevant to 
the relationship between a state and a foreign citizen. Thus, if federalism-based concerns were an 
important part of the justification for jurisdictional limitations, one would expect that aliens would 
receive less protection from the due process clause. Asahi is clearly inconsistent with this 
conclusion.‖).  
 142. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  
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treated the same, while non-resident aliens have no due process 
protections.
143
 The Supreme Court has explained the variability of 
constitutional protections with the degree of affiliation with the United 
States as follows: 
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally 
hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of 
rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful 
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct 
and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and 
secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to 
become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon 
naturalization. During his probationary residence, this Court has 
steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation except 
upon full and fair hearing. And, at least since 1886, we have 
extended to the person and property of resident aliens important 
constitutional guaranties—such as the due process of law of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
144
 
The defendants in both Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro were both 
non-resident and non-citizen. They are alien corporations, not people. It 
should follow from the case law dealing with the due process rights of 
people that the same rules would apply to non-citizen, non-resident 
corporations. In fact, it would be astonishing to think that non-citizen 
corporations had greater constitutional rights than people from other 
countries.
145
 Although most courts routinely apply personal jurisdiction 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); Austen L. Parrish, 
Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 28–32 (2006). The degree of protections accorded non-residents varies for different 
constitutional rights. For example, the Second Amendment does not apply even to resident non-
citizens. See, e.g., United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011). Many rights ―intimately related to the process of 
democratic self-government,‖ Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984), are excluded from resident 
non-citizens. E.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 
(2012) (refusing to extend the First Amendment and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), to 
the campaign contributions of temporary resident non-citizens). Except for that type of limitation, 
―[f]reedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.‖ Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 148 (1945). Most other constitutional protections arise when non-citizens enter the country 
and develop ―substantial connections with [the] country.‖ United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259, 271 (1990). See generally David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same 
Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 368 (2003). 
 144. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1950) (citations omitted); see also United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
 145. See Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: 
Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. 
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law to foreign parties without recognition of the inconsistency of the 
conflict with the procedural due process cases dealing with natural 
persons, there have been a few courts that have applied a lesser personal 
jurisdiction standard to foreign defendants.
146
 Given the due process cases 
that decline to give protections to non-resident non-citizens, it seems to me 
that the due process clause provides absolutely no protection to defendants 
like the ones in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro.
147
  
The three foreign defendants in Goodyear Dunlop Tires were 
organized under and operated in, respectively, Turkey, France, and 
Luxembourg.
148
 They did no business whatsoever in the United States. As 
a result, they must be considered to be both non-citizen and non-resident 
foreign nationals, having no due process rights under case law. One could 
argue that J. McIntyre‘s connections to the United States are great enough 
to classify it as a resident alien, with due process protections under current 
law.
149
 J. McIntyre did business in the U.S. for over a decade, with an 
annual presence at the trade show.
150
 However, I do not think that this 
limited business is anywhere near the level of activities that justifies 
giving due process protections to resident aliens. People who are allowed 
permanent residence in the United States, even though they do not become 
 
 
L. REV. 617, 633 (2012) (―[T]he idea that foreign nationals acting in foreign countries can claim U.S. 
constitutional rights is both highly controversial and contrary to other Supreme Court precedent.‖); 
Parrish, supra note 143, at 37 (―[T]he Court‘s current due process formulations in the jurisdictional 
context are incoherent with its approach to U.S. constitutionalism in other contexts.‖); id. at 56 (The 
Court should ―decouple the personal jurisdiction analysis [for foreign defendants] from the 
Constitution altogether.‖). 
 146. For opinions in which the court has applied a lesser standard to foreign defendants, see Gary 
B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1, 8 
(1987).  
American courts . . . have assumed that the constitutional principles developed in suits against 
[non-resident U.S. corporations] also govern jurisdiction over aliens. However, the question 
has not yet been definitively resolved whether the constitutional restraints that curb the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over [non-resident U.S. corporations] apply with congruent 
force in all contexts in which an alien is a defendant. Case law indicates that the same 
constraints of due process—namely, satisfaction of the minimum contacts standard—apply 
fully to jurisdiction over aliens. 
Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 116 (1983). 
 147. Rather than argue that due process does not apply, which is admittedly a bold proposition, 
one could argue for a constitutional due process doctrine tailored for alien corporations in which the 
interests of U.S. plaintiffs are taken into account. That would satisfy my concern. However, I think that 
that modification of personal jurisdiction law would require overruling the four cases that concern 
foreign defendants. My proposal does not require any overruling of precedent because the Court has 
not considered the position I am expressing.  
 148. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
 149. The foreign defendants in Goodyear Dunlop Tires were not present in the U.S. in any way, so 
this argument cannot be made for them.  
 150. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
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citizens, have much greater ties to our country than a business like J. 
McIntyre. J. McIntyre was more like an annual visitor as a result of its 
presence at the trade shows. In addition, making sales to the United States 
market from another country is far from the permanent residence that 
confers the full array of due process rights. Even if one were to conclude 
that J. McIntyre‘s connections to the United States are great enough to 
justify giving it some due process protections, it does not follow that it 
should be given personal jurisdiction protections.  
The cases that gave resident aliens due process protections were 
considering procedural due process, such as rights to notice and 
opportunity to be heard by impartial decision-makers. There is little cost to 
giving non-citizens procedural due process rights. The only cost is to the 
government, which must bear the time and expense of providing notice 
and impartial hearings.
151
 However, giving personal jurisdiction rights to 
foreign defendants in the manner done by the Supreme Court in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires and Nicastro imposes tremendous costs on citizens who lose 
their right to litigate in U.S. courts under U.S. tort law. That difference is 
reason enough to deny foreign defendants personal jurisdiction rights even 
if they are allowed procedural protections. Even more importantly, 
personal jurisdiction, although affecting the process of bringing someone 
into court, is much closer to substantive due process than procedural due 
process. The personal jurisdiction rules advance state sovereign rights and 
―Our Federalism,‖152 in addition to allowing a defendant to avoid distant 
litigation. Being free of a sovereign‘s power is more than a procedural 
right. If personal jurisdiction were merely one of a number of procedural 
rights guaranteed by due process, the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts
153
 would not have gone out its way to require some version of 
consent to jurisdiction by members of a plaintiff‘s class.154 In Shutts, the 
Court emphasized all the procedural protections given to members of a 
 
 
 151. This is true for other constitutional rights, like free speech and freedom from illegal searches 
and seizures. See supra note 143. 
 152. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 153. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 154. In Shutts, a class of about 33,000 leaseholders sued Phillips Petroleum for interest on late 
royalty payments in Kansas state court. Most class members had no contacts whatsoever with Kansas. 
They were not Kansas citizens, nor were their leases for Kansas land. Id. at 797. With an absence of 
the traditional bases for personal jurisdiction and with a lack of minimum contacts, the Supreme Court 
had to find another way to establish jurisdiction over the class members. After all, a loss in state court 
in the class action would bar later litigation by the leaseholders. The Court ruled that personal 
jurisdiction was established by consent, which class members manifested by choosing not to opt out of 
the class. Id. at 812.  
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class,
155
 but those protections did not justify the elimination of some basis 
for the court‘s jurisdiction over the members of the class. That is why the 
Supreme Court required a finding of consent by the class members to 
jurisdiction. Granted, the opt-out process provided only a weak version of 
consent, tolerable as a result of all the procedural protections in a class 
action, but it still was consent nonetheless. Contrast this with the class 
action rule that adequacy of representation can make up for a lack of 
notice in some instances. Here, one procedural requirement, adequacy of 
representation, means that another one, notice, is unnecessary. That the 
procedural protections in a class action do not eliminate the need for 
personal jurisdiction shows the different nature of personal jurisdiction 
rights.  
One could argue that personal jurisdiction protections should extend to 
foreign businesses as a way to help the economy. After all, many foreign 
firms may fear the tort system in the United States, which deters them 
from trading in the United States. The solicitor general made an argument 
similar to this in Helicol, when he claimed that jurisdiction premised on 
purchases in the U.S. would hurt our balance of trade.
156
 That is a logical 
argument, but no one knows if it is a realistic prediction. Even if the 
purchases would lead to jurisdiction, would Helicol still have purchased 
Bell helicopters because they were the best helicopters on the market? Or 
because they were less expensive than others? Or because Bell would 
reduce the price to account for Helicol‘s insurance costs? Too many 
variables go into a decision to choose between competing sellers of a 
product. Even if that argument makes sense for foreign purchasers of 
American products, it has no bearing on foreign sellers. Exports can help 
an economy by attracting foreign money to the United States; imports send 
dollars overseas. Even worse for our economic interests, the Court has 
disadvantaged firms that manufacture products in the United States.
157
 
They must answer to tort suits in U.S. forums, in which their liability is 
adjudicated under U.S. tort law. Their foreign competitors have a great 
advantage since their liability will be governed by the tort laws of their 
own country, which is sure to provide for miniscule damages when 
compared to what is available under U.S. tort law.
158
 In addition, the 
 
 
 155. Id. at 809–10. 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 157. Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637, 640 
(2012) (―[T]he Court‘s decision gives a competitive advantage to foreign firms seeking to sell their 
machines in the United States.‖). 
 158. In a famous quotation, Lord Denning said: ―As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant 
drawn to the United States.‖ Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (Eng. 
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Supreme Court has created the perverse incentive of encouraging 
American manufacturers to outsource production overseas through an 
independent entity in order to take advantage of the Nicastro holding. 
These issues of foreign trade are not within the expertise of judges. It 
would be better for foreign trade experts in the Commerce Department, the 
Executive, and Congress to study the issue rather than for the Court to 
make assumptions that result in the closing of U.S. courts for citizens. As 
Chief Justice Roberts recently wrote: ―Members of this Court are vested 
with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor 
the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to 
our Nation‘s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people 
disagree with them.‖159 This governance structural issue counsels against 
the Supreme Court making pronouncements that may have harmful 
economic effects. 
B. Jurisdiction in Tort Suits Against Foreign Manufacturers 
The freedom from the constraints of due process, as well as from the 
constraints of federalism, means that the Supreme Court is not obligated to 
apply the constitutional personal jurisdiction doctrine to foreign 
defendants.
160
 With the Constitution no longer the source of personal 
jurisdiction rights, the Court could still use its common law powers to craft 
special rules of jurisdiction applicable only to non-resident, alien 
defendants. Even if the Court were to conclude that the sliding scale of 
due process rights of foreign parties, dependent upon the degree of 
connections with the United States, mandated some constitutional 
protections for defendants like J. McIntyre, it should not be the entire 
 
 
C.A.) at 733. ―[C]ommentators generally believe that ‗compared with foreign courts, United States 
forums offer a plaintiff both lower costs and higher recovery.‘‖ Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving 
Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 487 (2011) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, 
International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 321, 323 (1994)); see also 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1981) (U.S. courts are ―extremely attractive to 
foreign plaintiffs . . . .‖); id. at 252 n.18 (noting reasons for the preference for U.S. courts); Stephen C. 
McCaffrey & Thomas O. Main, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
THEORY AND APPLICATION ch. 3 (2010); Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations 
from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 606–15 (2012). 
 159. Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 160. There are no treaties, conventions, or international laws that govern personal jurisdiction in 
civil lawsuits in the United States. Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and 
Recognition Practice on International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 
327, 329 (2004) (―The United States is not a party to any treaty . . . and thus the jurisdictional rules in 
the United States are the product of domestic law alone.‖); see also Parrish, supra note 143, at 50 & 
n.246. 
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panoply of rights granted to citizens.
161
 This would be an important change 
in the law because lessening personal jurisdiction rights would open up 
U.S. courts to injured citizens. For example, if the Court had applied a 
relaxed version of purposeful availment to Nicastro, the plurality more 
likely would have found personal jurisdiction from the targeting of the 
entire U.S. market. Similarly, weakened protections should have led the 
concurrence to find jurisdiction even with only one sale in New Jersey. 
This type of outcome is consistent with the personal jurisdiction rules of 
the European Union, which allows a tort suit to be brought in the state 
where the harm occurred.
162
 
Lesser personal jurisdiction protections for foreign defendants would 
ameliorate the harm done to workers and consumers under the current law. 
It is inconceivable to me that someone like Nicastro cannot sue in the 
United States but must go to Great Britain to sue and have his tort claims 
and damages resolved under English, and not American, law.
163
 I would be 
surprised if Nicastro even knew that he was operating a machine made in 
the United Kingdom. I am sure that he was shocked to learn that he cannot 
sue in New Jersey, even though he was injured there. With the movement 
of more and more manufacturing to other countries, there are sure to be 
more workers who are injured in the United States by products 
manufactured overseas. It is hard to believe that personal jurisdiction law 
should send U.S. workers to China to have their claims resolved in 
Chinese courts under Chinese law. If workers knew this result, they should 
refuse to operate foreign-made machinery, at least until their employers 
insured them against their tort losses. In addition, this limitation on 
jurisdiction does not just affect workers. It limits the ability of consumers 
to sue in the United States when they are injured by a foreign-made 
product. Given the rarity of contingency fee arrangements in foreign 
countries,
164
 coupled with the difficulty of finding a foreign lawyer, the 
 
 
 161. Weinberg, supra note 63, at 932 (―It must come down to saying, ‗Because it would be harder 
on the plaintiff in this case to sue elsewhere, it is proper to offer a little less due process protection to 
this defendant than we might have done in another case.‘‖); see also Silberman, supra note 158, at 
595–96 (noting different considerations when suit involves foreign defendant). The principal way that 
commentators have suggested a different treatment of alien defendants is to examine contacts with the 
U.S. rather than just with the forum state. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-
Country Defendants—Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 433–35 (1984); Maltz, 
supra note 141, at 674 n.43.  
 162. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12/4) art. 5(3) (EC). In addition the EU has special 
jurisdictional rules making it easier for consumers to sue in contract disputes. See id. arts. 15–17. 
 163. See Carrington, supra note 157, at 639 (―The protection of workers in New Jersey is a 
concern, indeed a duty, of the New Jersey government.‖). 
 164. See Virginia G. Maurer, Robert E. Thomas & Pamela A. DeBooth, Attorney Fee 
Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 272 (1999). 
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expense of litigating overseas, and the low probability of obtaining a 
substantial damage award, it is almost inevitable that tort suits will not be 
brought against foreign manufacturers, advantaging them even more over 
their U.S. competitors.
165
 
One other avenue may be open to someone like Nicastro, even under 
the current status of personal jurisdiction. Knowing that New Jersey, the 
site of the accident, is not an appropriate forum, jurisdiction could very 
well exist in Ohio. J. McIntyre reached out to Ohio and maintained 
relations with its Ohio distributor,
166
 so it is fair to conclude that the firm 
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Ohio. 
It ―targeted‖ Ohio. In addition, its activities in Ohio were related to the 
cause of action because the Ohio distributor was the seller of the machine 
for Nicastro‘s employer.167 It is strange that the doctrine would allow 
jurisdiction in the state of distribution but not in the state of injury, but at 
least it would give a forum in the United States to Nicastro for the 
application of our tort law.
168
  
C. Jurisdiction for Torts Occurring in Other Countries 
It is easier to understand the absence of jurisdiction in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires than in Nicastro. After all, the litigation in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires involved the death of two boys in France allegedly as a result of the 
negligence of companies having no connections with the United States.
169
 
Similarly, Helicol involved U.S. citizens working in Peru where they died 
in a helicopter crash.
170
 These accidents occurred on the soil of other 
sovereigns, and we could say that citizens traveling abroad should expect 
to litigate disputes in the countries where they arose. Nonetheless, I 
believe that personal jurisdiction law should permit people injured 
overseas to sue foreign tortfeasors in United States courts. Before the 
Court decided Helicol in 1984, a few decisions by other courts had led to 
the concept of ―jurisdiction by necessity,‖ under which a U.S. citizen 
 
 
 165. For a description of the difficulties of suing overseas, see Weinberg, supra note 63, at 933–
34.  
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 168. One could also argue that foreign sellers need to have a ―home‖ in the United States 
sufficient to trigger general jurisdiction and that Ohio should suffice for J. McIntyre. After all, it is the 
state with the greatest connections to the firm. However, I think that this is too much of a stretch of the 
Court‘s reasoning in Goodyear Dunlop Tires. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
 170. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol), 466 U.S. 408, 410 (1984). 
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would be able to sue for injuries sustained in other countries.
171
 This kind 
of jurisdiction arose from the belief that U.S. citizens were entitled to a 
U.S. forum. It is fair to say that Perkins bears some attributes of 
jurisdiction by necessity because the courts had reopened in the 
Philippines when the suit was brought in Ohio.
172
 However, the decision in 
Helicol is inconsistent with any notion of jurisdiction by necessity.
173
 
Nevertheless, if the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction did 
not apply to foreign defendants, the Supreme Court would be free to 
fashion this type of jurisdiction. It would be a major change for the Court 
to allow jurisdiction based solely on the residence of the plaintiff, when 
neither the defendant nor the cause of action has any connections with the 
forum. However, other countries base jurisdiction on the residence of the 
plaintiff, so the Court would be acting consistently with accepted 
international practices.
174
  
If the Court were to allow this type of jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants, the litigation would still be subject to other legal, as well as 
practical, constraints. The question of whether a court in the United States 
should be able to assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in connection 
with an accident that happened outside the United States raises political 
and international relations dimensions that are not present in domestic 
litigation. One could view this type of expansive jurisdiction as violating 
the sovereignty of the defendant‘s country. Since the issue is not strictly 
legal, there is no reason for the judiciary to be the only branch of 
government to resolve these kinds of problems. The executive and 
legislative branches should be able to help determine the proper way to 
handle liability for injuries suffered by U.S. citizens abroad. If problems 
 
 
 171. E.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat‘l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1965). 
 172. See supra note 42. 
 173. The Court briefly rejected an alternative argument for jurisdiction by necessity in a footnote 
in Helicol:  
As an alternative to traditional minimum-contacts analysis, respondents suggest that the Court 
hold that the State of Texas had personal jurisdiction over Helicol under a doctrine of 
‗jurisdiction by necessity.‘ We conclude, however, that respondents failed to carry their 
burden of showing that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum. It is 
not clear from the record, for example, whether suit could have been brought against all three 
defendants in either Colombia or Peru. We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of 
jurisdiction by necessity—a potentially far-reaching modification of existing law—in the 
absence of a more complete record. 
466 U.S. at 419 n.13 (citation omitted). To me, the need for complete joinder is a less compelling 
reason for jurisdiction by necessity than a desire to provide U.S. plaintiffs with access to the U.S. tort 
system. 
 174. Three countries that base jurisdiction on the plaintiff‘s residence are France, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. Born, supra note 146, at 14; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1137. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1748 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1707 
 
 
 
 
arise in other countries with United States tort judgments against their 
citizens, any concerned country can negotiate a treaty to limit this type of 
jurisdiction. Existing treaties concerning the enforceability of civil 
judgments can be modified if necessary.
175
 Treaty negotiations would 
reflect the public policy and political issues at stake in these foreign 
controversies, a much better basis for analyzing the problem rather than 
personal jurisdiction rules. Further, negotiating treaties on a country-by-
country basis would permit tailoring the jurisdictional rules to reflect our 
different political and economic relations with different countries. In 
addition to the State Department playing a role in treaty negotiations, 
Congress could help by enacting a jurisdictional statute.
176
 Congressional 
hearings and deliberations would provide a fuller understanding of the 
scope of the foreign tort problem and the consequences of the various 
jurisdictional alternatives. Finally, suits in the United States against 
foreign defendants raise enforcement problems that will limit the use of 
this expansive procedure. Just because a U.S. citizen has a judgment 
against a foreign defendant does not mean that the judgment will be 
enforced in the defendant‘s country or that the defendant will have 
sufficient assets in this country to pay the judgment.
177
 Nonetheless, it 
seems to me that allowing this type of jurisdiction by necessity is a better 
system than closing off the courts entirely to citizens injured in other 
countries. 
There is one other possible way for a U.S. citizen to recover: 
attachment of the foreign defendant‘s assets in a state as a way to provide 
quasi in rem jurisdiction. The opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner clearly 
indicates that all types of quasi in rem jurisdiction must satisfy the 
minimum contacts test.
178
 But that rule follows from the Court‘s due 
process analysis. With no or lessened due process protection for foreign 
 
 
 175. See Parrish, supra note 143, at 57 (―The deconstitutionalizing of jurisdiction would, 
therefore, presumably refresh the need to reach agreement on a multilateral judgments treaty.‖). 
 176. In a not unusual statement, the plurality in Nicastro pointed out that Congress could provide 
a forum in the United States for plaintiffs like Nicastro, even if current personal jurisdiction law did 
not. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011). There is a problem with 
this approach: Congress seldom has the interest to improve jurisdictional rules, both because 
legislators have more pressing problems to resolve and because better jurisdictional rules do not get 
someone re-elected. When Congress does tackle jurisdiction, broad statutes sometimes bring 
unforeseen consequences, as was the case with the enactment of the new supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). Nonetheless, Congress sometimes does act. My proposal for broad 
jurisdictional rules helps U.S. plaintiffs, with Congress then having the ability to narrow jurisdiction, 
unlike the Court‘s narrow rule that disadvantages U.S. citizens. 
 177. See Parrish, supra note 143, at 50 (noting that ―most countries resist enforcing U.S. 
judgments‖ even under current jurisdictional law). 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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defendants, the Court is free to fashion quasi in rem jurisdiction by 
necessity for foreign torts, consistent with its opinion in Shaffer. This 
result would be consistent with the jurisdictional practices of some 
European courts.
179
 Even if one were to conclude that foreign defendants 
should have the same due process protections as a U.S. citizen, one can 
distinguish the narrow holding of Shaffer from the foreign tort problem. 
Shaffer dealt with an intangible asset, while bank funds are tangible.
180
 
Further, there were other states in which the plaintiff in Shaffer could have 
brought the litigation, unlike the U.S. citizen injured abroad. A few courts 
and commentators have viewed quasi in rem jurisdiction as surviving the 
Shaffer opinion when attachment was the only way for a U.S. citizen to 
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.
181
 As I described above, I 
believe that the best option is to allow in personam jurisdiction in the 
courts of a plaintiff‘s state when the only alternative is to sue in a foreign 
country. However, quasi in rem necessity jurisdiction would at least assure 
that the foreign defendant had some small connection to the forum state. 
CONCLUSION 
The two personal jurisdiction decisions decided in June 2011 should 
settle any disputes over the limited meaning of general jurisdiction. The 
opinions in Nicastro, however, leave unresolved the debate over the scope 
of the stream of commerce doctrine, first raised in the Supreme Court by 
the four Justices in Asahi. Questions over the necessity for a ―plus‖ factor 
and the meaning of the purposeful availment standard are sure to arise 
again in litigation before the Court. Although the Court has applied the 
same personal jurisdictional rules to non-resident foreign nationals as it 
does to U.S. citizens, and no parties have argued otherwise, it is time for 
the Court to consider on the merits whether that constitutional protection 
should be accorded to non-resident, non-citizen corporations. If the court 
 
 
 179. Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden provide for what we label in personam 
jurisdiction just by the attachment of assets in the country. Born, supra note 146, at 14–15.  
 180. Justice Powell in his concurrence in Shaffer believed that quasi in rem jurisdiction should 
remain when land served as the basis for the suit. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) 
(Powell, J., concurring). He contrasted the permanent location of land from the uncertain location of 
intangible assets. Id. 
 181. E.g., Excel Shipping v. Seatrain Int‘l S.A., 584 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Feder v. 
Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: 
The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 74–76 (1978) (discussing jurisdiction by necessity and 
attachment of bank account); cf. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de 
Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979) (admiralty); Lea Brilmayer et al., supra note 30, at 655 
(The Shaffer opinion ―does not determine whether a defendant‘s ownership of unrelated property in 
the forum might sometimes constitute a countable contact, or even a sufficient contact by itself.‖). 
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were to rule that foreign businesses are not entitled to the same 
jurisdictional rules available to citizens, it could then begin the process of 
fashiniong a new law of personal jurisdiction more appropriate for the 
increased global nature of the world today. My hope is that the Court will 
be much more protective of United States citizens who are injured by 
foreign businesses, whether here or in other countries. Even if the Justices 
(and my readers) are not convinced by my arguments, at least this aspect 
of jurisdiction should be reconsidered without the baggage of rules that 
were designed for a smaller world made up of fifty co-equal sovereigns.  
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/4
